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Abstract 
In the present study, the persistence of personal false memories (FM) after social feedback that 
denies their truth was assessed with a procedure similar to Nash, Wade and Lindsay (2009b). 
Participants imitated actions performed by the experimenter (Session 1) and watched a 
doctored video with performed and critical “fake” actions (Session 2), followed by a memory 
rating and a recognition task. A few days later (Session 3) participants were clearly told that 
some memories were false and received daily reminders of the correct list of objects/actions 
before testing their memory again in Session 4. Results of both memory ratings and recognition 
indicated effective FM implantation. Interestingly, response times for correct rejections were 
longer for fake than true objects, suggesting participants struggled to ignore false suggestions. 
Crucial for our aim, Session 4 showed that FM persisted also after the debriefing and repeated 
presentations of correct list of objects/actions, suggesting that FM for actions are rather difficult 
to discard. 
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Introduction 
People can spontaneously report false memories about autobiographical experiences 
(e.g., Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010), claiming to remember events that never really 
happened or remember things in a way that is different from how they actually occurred. Many 
studies have also shown that autobiographical false memories can be easily induced with a 
variety of experimental procedures (for a discussion see e.g., Laney & Loftus, 2013), which 
capitalize on the reconstructive nature of memory retrieval (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Conway, 1997; 
Katz, 1989; Loftus, 2005; Schacter, Coyle, Fischbach, Mesulam, & Sullivan, 1995; Wade, 
Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). For example, false memories can be easily induced via 
suggestions (e.g., Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Mazzoni, 
Loftus, Seitz, & Lynn, 1999 Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Milling, 2002); imaginative 
procedures (e.g., Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sheramn, 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003), 
forward and backward inferences (e.g., Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Hannigan & Tippens Reinitz, 
2001), plausibility manipulations (e.g., Hart & Schooler, 2006; Johnson & Raye, 2000; 
Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001), the replacement of forgotten items with new ones (e.g., 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985), etc. (for an outline of the processes involved in the creation of 
false memories, see Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002).  
While most studies have focused on the processes and conditions involved in the 
creation of false memories, the question of their persistence has raised much less interest (e.g., 
Otgaar, Candel, Merckelbach & Wade, 2009; Otgaar, Scoboria and Smeets, 2013). However, 
after experimentally creating false memories, one fundamental research issue is to understand 
whether they are long-lasting and persist after the debriefing. In other words, are debriefings 
successful? Do participants disavow and discard these false memories? This is the main aim of 
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the present study. Specifically, we examined whether a very clear and targeted debriefing on 
the falsity of these memories help people 
identify false memories as false.  
In the next sections, studies on the duration of false memories will be briefly reviewed, 
and the effect of debriefing after the implantation of false memories will be examined more 
thoroughly. We will then introduce the procedure of false memory implantation that will be 
used in the current study. 
False memories: persistence 
Ours is not the first study to examine the duration of false memories. For example, 
when a misinformation procedure was used to induce false memories, about half of the 
implanted false memories were found one and a half years later, and at the same rate as true 
memory (Zhu et al., 2012). Similarly, Huffman, Crossman and Ceci (1997) found that even 
after two years, half of the children tested in a previous study by Ceci, Huffman, Smith and 
Loftus (1994) still assented to at least one of the false events originally implanted. These results 
suggest that even a brief exposure to misinformation can lead to long-term false memory 
(seemingly, the strength of memory trace was similar for true and false memories). False 
memories can then persist after a long delay. False memories for actions might be even longer 
lasting than false memories induced by repeated exposure to misinformation, as in the Zhu et 
al., (2012) case and in the case of the repeated interviews used by Ceci et al. (1994). If the 
credibility that comes with doctored visual information is a key factor, as suggested by Nash 
et al. (2009a), then we might find that this type of false memory is rather likely to survive both 
time and the debriefing procedure. In addition, the Nash et al. (2009a) procedure creates 
multiple false memories, thus increasing the likelihood of observing false memories after one 
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False memories: the effect of debriefing 
Previous studies have also reported mixed findings on the effectiveness of debriefing. 
The pioneering study of Loftus and Pickrell, 1995) on false memory implantation reported 
some notable comments of the participants to the debriefing. The false memories were created 
by providing participants with detailed information about four episodes from their childhood. 
Participants were convinced that all these events had been given to the experimenter by older 
relatives. Only three events were true. The other one was the false event about getting lost in a 
shopping mall. A reliable percentage of participants developed a false memory for this event. 
In the debriefing, it was stated that in fact the getting lost event had not been provided by the 
relatives, while the true ones had. Interestingly, it was observed that some participants 
continued to claim they remembered getting lost in the shopping mall even after debriefing. 
More recently, Otgaar, Candel, Merckelbach and Wade (2009) also reported that some child 
participants claimed to remember a false event even after the debriefing was given, although, 
again, no memory tests assessed the effect of the debriefing, and just remarks made by 
participants after the experiment were reported. In their study, Otgaar et al. (2009) examined 
whether prevalence information, that is reports on the frequency of an implausible event, can 
promote in children false memories for an implausible event. Participants received prevalence 
information in the form of a false newspaper article about a true (e.g., almost choking on a 
candy) or a false event (e.g., abducted by a UFO). The authors found that prevalence 
information increased the number of false memories in 7–8year old children. Crucially, an 
extensive number of children were extremely surprised during the debriefing when they were 
told that the false event had not happened to them. For instance, one 8-year old child responded, 
‘It really did happen’ and another one said, ‘I really can remember seeing the UFO’ (Otgaar et 
al., 2009, p.120). More in general, after the debriefing, 39% of the children were absolutely 
convinced that they had experienced the false events. These findings suggest that the false 
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memories in this study were resistant to the debriefing session. In a more recent work, Otgaar, 
Scoboria and Smeets (2013) examined in adults and children how belief and memory of 
childhood events change after debriefing. Participants were presented with true (visit to a theme 
park) and false (hot air balloon ride) narratives and interviewed twice within the course of two 
weeks. After the second interview, participants were debriefed and rated their memory and 
belief for the true and false events, along with memory characteristics. After one month, only 
the adult participants rated again their memory and belief about the true and false events, and 
provided details about their memories. In the first interview, participants were asked to report 
all the details they could recall about each event, and to focus and try again if no memories 
were recalled (lack of memory was explained as being normal). Context reinstatement and 
guided imagery were also used to create the false memory, and participants were asked to think 
about the narratives daily for one week. The procedure induced false memories, which were 
reported in both interviews (in 32% and 36%, respectively). Interestingly, when assessed one 
month later, participants, 9% of the sample still reported false memories, which persisted after 
the debriefing. The authors concluded that the debriefing is rather effective in adults.   
However, Otgaar et al. (2013) also found that the debriefing, in some cases, affected 
the belief in the occurrence of the event more than the memory itself, thus creating what have 
been called as non-believed memories (more on non-believed memories later; see also 
Mazzoni, Scoboria & Harvey, 2010). This suggests that in some cases the debriefing might be 
only partially effective. In addition, in the Otgaar et al. (2013) study, only one false memory 
was experimentally created. What happens when multiple and rather strong false memories are 
created instead? Compared to assessing just one false memory in a study, examining multiple 
false memories helps get greater statistical precision data. Moreover, it has also applied 
implications. In the forensic setting, for example, poor interviewing techniques can distort the 
memory of witnesses in multiple ways (Bruck, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1998; Fisher, Geiselman, 
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& Raymond, 1987; Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Zaragoza, Payment, Ackil, Drivdahl, 
& Beck, 2001), and might induce a variety of false memories for personal events (Chrobak & 
Zaragoza, 2013; Kassin et al., 2010; Leo & Davis, 2010; Loftus, 1979; Shaw & Porter, 2013). 
It is important to assess the persistence of multiple false memories, and whether witnesses, for 
example, can easily identify them as false and thus reject them when they receive a clear 
feedback that these memories are indeed false.  
Procedure used to create multiple false memories 
Multiple false memories can be experimentally created for non-performed actions 
(Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009b).  The procedure proposed by Nash et al. (2009b) stems from 
previous findings showing that doctored visual evidence (e.g., doctored photos , Wade, Garry, 
Read, & Lindsay, 2002) provides perceptual information that is easily mistaken as true, and 
thus tricks the monitoring system (Johnson, Hastroudi, & Lyndsay, 1993) into classifying 
unexperienced events as experienced (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004).  
In the original study of Nash et al. (2009b) on false memories for actions, each 
participant observed and performed simple actions while being filmed. After the participant 
left, the RA filmed himself performing 2 of the 4 critical fake actions. The critical fake actions 
were doctored using a split-screen method, wherein clips from true actions (i.e., participants 
observing the RA performing actions) were combined with the critical fake actions. The final 
doctored videos showed the participant watching the experimenter performing the fake action. 
The participants then returned 2 days after the initial session and watched a 4-minute video 
sequence containing 10 original clips and 2 clips portraying the doctored critical fake actions. 
The subjects were divided into three groups. Self + RA subjects watched themselves observing 
the RA performing true and critical fake actions. The RA-only subjects viewed clips that 
contained only the RA performing the same actions as the Self+RA group, this time themselves 
not included. Stranger-only subjects viewed a stranger performing true and critical fake actions 
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in a different room setting. After watching the video sequence, the participants were asked to 
imagine actions that were presented in the monitor for 10 s. A total of 15 actions were imagined, 
2 of which were critical actions: one previously presented in the video sequence (video + 
imagine)  and the other was not presented (imagine only) . The participants then completed the 
Autobiographical Beliefs and Memory Questionnaire (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 
2004), containing 12 performed actions, 2 critical fake actions (not performed but watched in 
the video), 2 control actions (not performed nor watched) and 12 new actions. They were asked 
to rate their belief and memory for each action on a 1-8 scale (8 highest rating). The participants 
were then debriefed and guessed which of the actions were fake. Higher ratings (and thus more 
false memories) were obtained in the Self+RA group, compared to RA-only or Stranger-only 
groups, and overall higher ratings for false than true actions were observed, indicating that 
being exposed to doctored (false) visual evidence can create false beliefs and memories. A very 
similar procedure was used also in a study by Clark, Nash, Fincham and Mazzoni (2012), 
confirming that in the Self+RA group false memories for actions can be obtained.  
 Nash, Wade and Brewer (2009a), found that by manipulating the nature of false 
evidence, enhanced familiarity and imagery alone are insufficient to cause large memory 
distortion effects, whereas the credibility of the false evidence seems to play a crucial role. 
Doctoring a video provides this credibility because it is evaluated as a credible source of 
information. 
The present study  
In the current study, a slight modification of the Nash et al. (2009b) procedure was used 
to create multiple false memories for actions. Participants first imitated a number of actions 
performed by the experimenter on objects (Session 1). In Session 2, they watched a doctored 
video containing both a subset of performed actions (“true” actions) and, crucially, critical 
“fake” actions, that the participants had not performed. Participants then rated their belief and 
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memory for the true, the fake, and completely new actions (namely, actions never performed 
in session 1 and never seen in session 2). In Session 2 they also performed a recognition task 
in which they were presented with pictures of objects (true, fake and new) and for each one 
they were asked to respond, as fast and accurately as possible, whether during the first session 
they had or had not performed an action with it. One to five days after the recognition task, 
participants were fully debriefed (Session 3) and were told that some objects presented in the 
videos had not been presented in Session 1 (i.e., actions related to those objects were not 
performed). In other words, participants were clearly told that some (false) memories were 
false. We aimed to obtain very persistent false memories in Session 3 to avoid the potential 
criticism that the effect of debriefing could be attributed to the weak nature of the false 
memories representation. For this reason, between Session 2 and 3 participants were asked to 
repeatedly imagine the entire set of performed and fake actions, in line with previous arguments 
(Nash et al., 2009b) that presenting the doctored evidence in combination with imagination 
might lead to an additive effect, thus enhancing the strength of the false memories. Between 
Session 3 and Session 4, when the final memory tests were administered, the debriefing was 
enhanced by sending one email per day containing the list of true objects only. This was done 
to ensure the debriefing was not forgotten and to increase its effectiveness. Session 4 was held 
one week after Session 2, and participants again rated their belief and memory for all types of 
actions and completed the recognition task.  
While adopting an existing procedure, there were some novel elements in our study 
compared to Nash et al. (2009b) and to Otgaar et al. (2013). First, while Nash et al. (2009b) 
assessed the effect of the doctored videos using only subjective belief and memory ratings, the 
current study also included a recognition task. Confident false recognition indicates that people 
accept the object they recognize as one with which they had performed an action (confident 
false recognition can indicate either the creation of false memories for actions or a change in 
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response criteria that make people accept the item as old). We also recorded response times, 
which allows for the assessment of hesitations in correct rejections and thereby examine 
whether suggestions can be easily ignored by participants.  Second, and in line with the study 
by Otgaar et al. (2013) and Clark et al. (2012), we also assessed whether debriefing created 
non-believed memories, which are memories with a vivid sense of recollection that are no 
longer believed (NBMs; Mazzoni et al, 2010). NBMs indicate that debriefing decreases the 
belief in the veridicality of the memory, while affecting significantly less the memory 
representation itself, which in several cases keeps the characteristics of a recollective 
experience (see Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2015). To assess NBMs, in Sessions 3 and 4 
we used a variation of the procedure by Clark, Nash, Fincham and Mazzoni (2012) (see also 
Mazzoni, Clark, & Nash, 2014). In the original study, the authors presented the debriefing and 
the questionnaires approximately 4 hours after Session 2, and detected a sizeable percentage of 
non-believed memories. In our procedures we split Clark et al.’s (2012) Session 3 into two 
different sessions, the debriefing session (our Session 3) and a new test session (our Session 
4). Furthermore, we expanded the time interval between Session 2 and the debriefing phase 
(from 4 hours to a few days).   
Unlike Otgaar et al. (2013), we examined the effect of debriefing and the existence of 
NBMs for multiple recent actions, and not for one single past complex experience. The recency 
of the events and their relative simplicity, as well as the daily presentation of the list of true 
objects might enhance the effectiveness of the debriefing. However, as already stated, the 
strength and multiplicity of false memories created with the doctored video, as well as the 
repeated imagination before the debriefing, might increase the likelihood of creating false 
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To sum up, in this study, we first aimed at replicating the main finding (false memories 
for actions) obtained by Nash et al. (2009b) by assessing not only subjective ratings but also 
accuracy and response times in a recognition task in which true, fake and new objects were 
presented. If the videos create false memories, as claimed by Nash et al. (2009b), one should 
observe lower accuracy for fake compared to new objects. Furthermore, if information in the 
doctored video cannot be easily ignored, response times for correct rejections of fake objects 
should be higher than those for completely novel objects. The effect on response times can be 
due either to the presence of a strong false memory (i.e., a good mental representation that feels 
somewhat like a true memory), or to false information interfering with decision processes, or 
both. In any case, it would suggest that participants struggle to ignore the effect of the 
experimental manipulation even when the false memory is identified as false and correctly 
rejected. Second, we assessed whether multiple false memories for actions persist after a clear, 
enhanced debriefing and across a relatively long time-interval (i.e., 1 week). This can be 
revealed by relatively high memory and belief ratings, and a lower rate of correct rejections for 
fake objects compared to completely novel objects. Finally, we examined whether this 
procedure created NBMs.  
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-one undergraduate students from Istanbul Şehir University taking the Introduction 
to Psychology course completed all four sessions of the study. There were 50 women and 11 
men, and their ages ranged from 18-26 (M=20.33, SD=1.47). They were compensated with 
course credits for their participation. The research was approved by the Institutional Review 
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Materials  
We selected 32 common-use objects (see Appendix A). Of these, 6 were fillers and 
were presented in all sessions to all participants. Of the remaining 26, two were novel fillers 
and presented to all participants only in the recognition task. The remaining 24 were divided 
in three critical groups, ‘true’, ‘fake, and ‘new’, used for all analyses and counterbalanced 
across participants. Fillers (e.g., screwdriver, wine opener) were objects which had been 
presented and with which all participants had performed an action (e.g., twisting the 
screwdriver similar to tightening a screw, using a wine opener) in Session 1. Fillers appeared 
in the video sequence, the questionnaires and the recognition tasks. ‘True’ objects (e.g., mobile 
phone, teaspoon) were objects on which both the experimenter and the participants had 
performed an action (e.g., picking up the mobile phone, mixing using a teaspoon) in Session 1. 
They were then presented for recognition in Session 2 (pre-debriefing) and 4 (post-debriefing). 
Fake objects (e.g., keys, toothbrush) were used only by the experimenter during the filming of 
fake actions (e.g., opening a doorknob with a key, brushing teeth with a toothbrush), and then 
presented for recognition in Session 2 (pre-debriefing) and 4 (post-debriefing). New objects 
(e.g., book, paperclip) were presented only in the recognition tasks (Sessions 2 & 4).  
Participants also completed belief and memory questionnaire, which was the same as 
in Clark et al. (2012), with the only difference being that in our study the belief questionnaire 
was always completed first.   
The questionnaire contained a list of 20 objects, 4 true, 4 fake, 4 new, 6 fillers old and 
2 filler novel objects. It was composed of a belief part and a memory part, with a brief 
introduction explaining the distinction between belief and memory. Beliefs were defined as the 
conviction that something happened in a person’s past even in the absence of any memory for 
it. Memories were defined as a clear picture ‘in your head’ about an event. To further explain 
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the difference of belief and memory, participants were presented examples. Participants were 
told that we believe we were born even if we don't remember the event in itself; we believe we 
had breakfast on a certain day 10 years ago because we always have breakfast, not because we 
have a specific memory (i.e., what did we eat for breakfast or where was I sitting) for that 
specific breakfast.  For each object participants were asked to rate how strong they believed (1-
no belief, to 8-strong belief) or remembered (1-no memory, to 8–strong memory) performing 
each action. Demographic data were also collected (age, handedness and years of schooling). 
The recognition task on the same 20 objects was completed using E-prime software 2.0.  
Design 
This is a within-participant, 3 (Type of Objects: true, fake and new) x 2 (sessions: pre 
vs post debriefing) design. 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure is a variant of the one ideated by Nash et al. (2009b) and 
by Clark et al. (2012). All participants went through four sessions. Session 1 and 2 were 
separated by two days, session 3 was held 2-5 days after Session 2 and Session 4 one week 
after Session 2.  The four sessions were run individually. 
Session 1. The participants were informed that the study was about imitating actions. 
They were told that the researcher would perform actions on objects for 12 seconds each (each 
action performed three times) and the participants’ task was to carefully observe and imitate 
the action afterwards. They were also informed that the entire session would be filmed assuring 
the confidentiality of the video. After getting informed consent, the researcher and the 
participant sat at a table facing each other. All ‘true’ and filler objects were placed inside a box 
located on the table, at the researcher’s side. The researcher began taking out one object at a 
time and carried out a pre-determined action with it (e.g., shaking a small box, writing with a 
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pencil). The participant was to observe and imitate the action on the object. This observe-copy 
task continued until all 14 objects (8 presented and ‘true’ and 6 fillers) in the box were used.  
Participants were then thanked, asked to come back 2 days later for Session 2 and told 
not to talk about the experiment with friends and classmates. Immediately after the participant 
left the laboratory, the researcher returned to the table with the same setting and started filming 
herself performing actions with the fake objects. The same set-up and position of the camera 
was maintained.   
Video-editing.  The doctored videos were edited using Adobe After Effects. To make 
the participants believe that they had performed actions with the fake objects, we edited out the 
parts in which the participant was imitating the action. We then combined the parts of the 
genuine video of Session 1, in which the participant was passively observing the researcher 
performing actions with objects, with the fake video where the researcher was carrying out 
actions with the four fake objects that had not been used before (see Figure 1). In all videos, 
the researcher was shown while performing actions to objects while the participant was 
observing. The video sequence was created using MovieMaker, each clip separated by a 5 
second blank screen.  The video sequence was composed of 18 clips (14 presented objects -8 
true and 6 fillers- and 4 fake).  
Session 2. After 2 days, participants watched the doctored video sequence twice. To 
ensure that participants paid attention to the video sequence, in the first viewing, they were 
asked to write how many times per week they usually perform an action with the objects shown. 
In the second viewing, they verbally described what was happening in each clip (e.g., using a 
wine opener, wearing a scarf). Next, they solved anagrams for 2 minutes and were then asked 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
The recognition task followed. Participants were shown via E-Prime 2.0 photos of the 
same 20 objects presented in the questionnaire. For each, they were asked to answer the 
question, “Do you remember performing an action with this object?” as fast and as accurately 
as they could by pressing the B key for YES and the N key for NO; both keys were labelled. 
Photos of objects were presented for a maximum of 5 sec, separated by a blank screen (1 sec) 
and by a fixation cross (500ms). Each photo was presented twice (never in sequence) to obtain 
more reliable data for response times. Responses and response times were recorded by the 
computer. Session 2 ended by reminding the participants to come back a few days later for 
Session 3. Between Session 2 and 3, participants received daily emails with the list of objects 
(for both performed and fake actions), asked to think about carrying out an action with all the 
objects in the list, and to send a confirmation e-mail after completing the task. This was done 
to strengthen false memories for fake actions. 
Sessions 3 and 4. In Session 3, participants were debriefed and were told that some of 
the clips they had watched in Session 2 were fake. The experimenter explicitly indicated which 
objects and performed actions were false. Specifically, the experimenter showed doctored clips 
to the participants and explained how they were created. The participants were told that the 
fake clips were filmed after they left the laboratory in Session 1 and were edited using a specific 
computer program. To enhance the effect of debriefing, after the debriefing, participants 
received the correct list once a day via email (i.e., between Sessions 3 and 4). Each time, 
participants were asked to think about carrying out an action with the objects in the list, and to 
send a confirmation e-mail after completing the task. On the 6th day, subjects came in for 
Session 4, the last and final session, and completed the same questionnaire and recognition task 
as in Session 2. At the end of Session 4, the experimenter debriefed participants with the true 
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Results 
All participants were included in the analyses. We ran a repeated measure 2 (Session 
pre- and post- debriefing) x 3 (Type of Object- true, fake, new) ANOVA for each dependent 
variable of interest: belief ratings, memory ratings, accuracy and response times. Table 1 shows 
the mean Belief, Memory and Accuracy Ratings and the mean Response Times.  
Belief Ratings 
The results of the overall 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA on belief ratings showed a 
significant main effect of Type of Object (Greenhouse–Geisser correction; F(1.70,102.04) = 
337.08, p < .001, ηp
2 = .85), with participants giving higher belief ratings for true (M=7.53, 
SD=.96) than fake (M=3.23, SD=2.52) and new objects (M=1.75, SD=1.69)  (see Table 1). In 
addition, there was also a significant main effect of Session (F(1,60) = 47.35, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.44), with Session 2- pre debriefing (M=4.76, SD=2.94) being higher than Session 4- post 
debriefing (M=3.58, SD=3.08). These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction 
between Type of Object and Session (F(2,120) = 30.20, p < .001, ηp
2 = .34). Results revealed 
higher ratings for used objects than fake objects (t(121)=17.07, p<.001, Cohen’s d =1.55; used 
objects were also rated higher than the new objects (t(121)=29.79, p<.001, Cohen’s d = 2.71 . 
Interestingly, fake objects received higher ratings than new objects, t(121) = 7.55, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = .69. As shown in Table 1, while there was no change in belief for true objects 
before and after the debriefing, there was a significant decrease over sessions in belief for fake 
and new objects. This was confirmed by the post hoc t-tests comparing the two sessions across 
all types of objects. While true objects did not differ in belief ratings between pre- and post-
debriefing (t(60) = -.39, p = .70,  Cohen’s d = -.05), both fake and new objects were rated 
higher in Session 2 than in Session 4, (t(60) = 7.51, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.96 and t(60) = 
4.05, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .52; respectively).  
 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
To further analyze the interaction, we also conducted separate ANOVAs and t-tests for 
Session 2 (pre-debriefing) and Session 4 (post-debriefing). In Session 2, before the debriefing, 
a repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant differences in belief ratings for each type of 
object (F(2,120) =114.60, p < .001, ηp
2 = .66).  Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni 
correction revealed that true objects were rated higher than fake, (t(60)= 8.25, p < .001 Cohen’s 
d = 1.06), and new objects, (t(60)= 15.56, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.00). Important for our aim, 
belief for fake objects was higher than for new objects, (t(60)=6.54, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .84), 
indicating that doctored videos significantly increased participants’ belief in fake actions. 
Also in Session 4, after the debriefing, the main effect of object type remained significant, 
(Greenhouse–Geisser correction; F(1.43,85.51) = 582.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .91). At the 
Bonferroni adjusted post hoc comparisons, true objects were rated higher than fake, (t(60)= 
21,48, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.77) and new objects, (t(60)=37.33, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 4.81). 
Important to our aim, after the Bonferroni correction, ratings for fake objects remained 
significantly higher than new objects, (t(60)=4.72,p < .001, Cohen’s d = .61). These results 
suggest that false memories are still believed in even after the debriefing.  
Memory Ratings 
The 2x3 overall repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Type 
of Object (Greenhouse–Geisser correction; F(1.74,104.47) = 365.29, p < .001, ηp
2 = .86), with 
participants showing higher memory ratings for true (M=7.50, SD=.93) than fake (M=3.11, 
SD=2.53)  and new objects (M=1.70, SD=1.70), as shown in Table 1. The main effect of session 
was also significant (F(1,60) = 38.32, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39), with Session 2 (M=4.70, SD=2.99) 
being higher than Session 4 (M=3.51, SD=3.06). A significant interaction qualified the main 
effects (F (2,120) = 31.42, p < .001, ηp
2 = .34). True objects were rated higher than fake (t(121)= 
17.81, p<.001, Cohen’s d=1.62) and new objects (t(121)= 31.18, p<.001, Cohen’s d=2.83. Fake 
objects received overall higher ratings than new objects, (t(121) = 7.38, p <.001, Cohen’s d 
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=.67). Similarly to belief, also for memory ratings, no decrease was observed between Session 
2 and 4 for true objects, while a significant decrease was observed for fake and new objects. In 
order to analyze the interaction, we ran post hoc t-tests with Bonferroni correction comparing 
sessions across all types of objects. Similar to belief ratings, memory ratings for fake objects 
were higher in session 2, (t(60) = 7.26, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .94), than in Session 4. The ratings 
for new objects also significantly decreased in between sessions, (t(60) = 4.11, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = .54), whilst ratings for true objects did not differ between pre and post debriefing 
(t(60) = -.24, p = .81, Cohen’s d = -.03). 
To further analyze the interaction, we conducted separate ANOVAs and t-tests for 
Session 2 (pre-debriefing) and Session 4 (post-debriefing). In Session 2, before the debriefing, 
a one way repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant differences in memory ratings 
(F(2,120) = 118.27, p < .001, ηp
2 = .66). Post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni adjusted) showed 
that true objects were rated higher than fake (t(60)= 8.45, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.09) and new 
objects, (t(60) = 15.90, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.05). Important for our aim, memory for fake 
objects was higher than for new objects, (t(60)=6.43, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .83). These data 
show that doctored videos created memories for the fake objects. 
Results were similar in Session 4, after the debriefing. The main effect of object type 
was significant, (Greenhouse–Geisser correction; F(1.44,86.60) = 713.38, p < .001, ηp
2 = .92). 
The Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons showed that true objects were rated 
significantly higher than fake, (t(60)= 24.07, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 3.11), and new objects, 
(t(60)= 44.54, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 5.75). Importantly, fake objects were still rated higher 
than new objects, (t(60)=4.46, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .58), indicating that memories were still 
present for fake objects even after the debriefing, hence suggesting that these ‘fake 
object/action memories’ were hard to discount.  
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We compared belief and memory ratings before and after the debriefing, in order to 
assess the frequency of non-believed memories, in which belief ratings are 1 or more points 
lower than memory ratings (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014). We found only 7% of 
non-believed memories, which was too low to run a full analysis. 
Accuracy 
To evaluate how participants distinguished between signal and noise trials, we computed 
d′, a measure of signal detection sensitivity (e.g., Green & Swets, 1966) for both fake and new 
objects. For each participant, we calculated the proportion of hits (“yes” responses when the 
stimulus was a signal, i.e., true objects) and false alarms for fake objects (“yes” responses when 
the stimulus was a fake object), as well as false alarms for new objects (“yes” responses when 
the stimulus was a new object). The log linear approach was used to calculate hit and false 
alarm rates (Hautus, 1995). 
A 2x2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) applied to the d′ values across Session 2 and Session 
4 showed a significant main effect of Type of Object (F(1,60) = 77.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = .56). We 
also detected a main effect of session, (F(1,60) = 44.02, p < .001, ηp
2 = .42). The interaction 
between Type of Object and Session was also significant, (F(1,60) = 37.98, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39). 
Participants showed higher sensitivity for new objects (d’=2.85, M= 2.85, SD=.69) compared 
to fake objects (d’=2.05,M=2.05, SD=1.25) (t(121) = -8.98, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .81). 
Sensitivity (Bonferroni adjusted) was significantly higher in Session 4 (d’=2.76, M=2.76, 
SD=.72) compared to Session 2 (d’=2.13, M=2.13,SD=1.28) (t(121) = 6.22, p < .001, Cohen’s 
d = .88). This interaction was mainly due to the fact that, compared to Session 2, in Session 4 
sensitivity did not increase for new objects (t(60)= -1.42, p = .16, Cohen’s d = -.20), while it 
increased significantly for the fake ones (t(60) = -7.08, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -.96), indicating 
that after the debriefing participants were better able to detect false memories.  
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At Session 2, a significant difference in sensitivity was detected between fake and new 
objects (t(60) = -8.89, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -1.24). Interestingly, the same result holds at 
Session 4 (t(60) = -3.03, p < .01, Cohen’s d = -.41) (both results are Bonferroni adjusted) 
thereby suggesting that false memories remain rather difficult to discard  after the debriefing . 
, 
Response Times 
Response times refer to hits for true object recognition, and correct rejections for fake 
and new object recognition. The overall 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of Type of Object (Greenhouse–Geisser correction; F(1.27, 53.48) = 10.64, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .20), with significantly higher response times for fake (M=1118.89, SD=576.42)  
compared to new objects, M=890.13 SD=181.68, whereas response times for true objects 2 
(M=885.73, SD=242.05) were significantly lower than for fake) and new objects.There was 
also a significant main effect of Session (F(1,42) = 18.79, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31) with higher 
response times in Session 2 (M=1036.53, SD=561.35) compared to Session 4 (M= 
878.62,SD=235.92). These results were qualified by a significant interaction between Type of 
Object and Session (Greenhouse–Geisser correction; F(1.18,49,61) = 7.14, p < .005, ηp
2 = .15). 
True objects had lower response time than fake (t(102)= -3.68, p<.001, Cohen’s d=-.36 ) and 
new objects (t(102)= -2.48, p<.05, Cohen’s d = -.25), whereas, fake objects had higher response 
time than new objects (t(102) = 3.26, p <.01, Cohen’s d =.32). Table 1 shows that while there 
was a substantial decrease in response times between Session 2 and 4 for fake objects, no 
change was observed for true and new objects. Post hoc t tests also showed that response times 
for true and new objects did not differ pre and post debriefing, (t(60) = 1.39, p = .17 and t(60) 
= 1.69, p = .10; respectively), while fake objects were correctly rejected in Session 4 at a greater 
speed than in Session 2, (t(42) = 3.5, p < .005, Cohen’s d = .62). 
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To further analyze the interaction, we conducted separate ANOVAs and t-tests for 
Session 2 (pre-debriefing) and Session 4 (post-debriefing). A repeated measures ANOVA for 
Session 2 data revealed a significant difference in response times across Object Types at 
session 2 (Greenhouse–Geisser correction; F(1.17, 50.47) = 9.09, p < .001, ηp
2 = .18). Not 
surprisingly, correct recognition for true objects was faster than for fake objects (t(43)= -2.98, 
p < .05, Cohen’s d = -.45). Time to correctly reject new objects was not different from correctly 
accept true objects (t(60)=-1.58, p=.12, Cohen’s d= 0.20). Interestingly, correct rejections for 
fake objects were slower than for new objects (t(43)= 3.22, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .49,), thereby 
suggesting that false suggestions cannot be easily ignored. All the comparisons were with 
Bonferroni correction. 
The same repeated measures ANOVA at session 4 revealed a significant difference in 
reaction times across Object Types, (Greenhouse–Geisser correction; F(1.77,102.53) = 4.42, p 
< .05, ηp
2 = .07). To account for multiple comparisons, Bonferroni correction was applied. 
Results revealed that true objects were still recognized faster than fake (t(58)=-2.86, p < .05, 
Cohen’s d = -.38) even after debriefing. RTs for true objects did not differ from new objects 
(t(60)= -2.39, p = .20). Similarly, on this occasion response times for fake and new objects did 
not differ (t(58)= 1.07, p =.29). 
Discussion 
The persistence of false memories for actions over one week, and after an enhanced 
debriefing, was examined. There are three main findings in this study. First, the results confirm 
that the doctored videos procedure developed by Nash and colleagues (2009b) produces false 
memories for actions, as clearly shown by the results in Session 2 (pre-debriefing), in which 
belief and memory ratings were higher for fake than new objects. While these results replicate 
the findings by Nash et al. (2009b), in our study the effect of doctored videos on memory is 
also confirmed by the results obtained in the recognition task, where we found significantly 
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lower accuracy for fake objects, which is almost half compared to new objects. These results 
suggest that the procedure developed by Nash and colleagues significantly affects the decision 
of the participants in the recognition task.  
Second, response times in Session 2 show that even when fake objects are correctly 
rejected, the responses were slower compared to rejecting new objects. This very interesting 
result indicates that, even when participants did not report false memories, the doctored video 
slowed down the decision to reject. This can be due to the presence of memories for fake actions 
created by the videos, which can be discarded only after a systematic (and thus more time 
consuming) monitoring of the characteristics of the memory representation (e.g., Johnson et 
al., 1993). It could also be due to false information interfering with the decision processes 
during recognition. In any case, the results indicate that false suggestions cannot be easily 
ignored by the participants.  
Third, and most interestingly, the effect of the doctored videos is still evident in Session 
4, after the debriefing. In the debriefing (Session 3), participants were told that some specific 
objects were false and no action was performed on them (see Clark et al., 2012, for a similar 
procedure). Importantly, the debriefing was enhanced by presenting the participants the correct 
list of objects once a day after the debriefing until the final test in Session 4, and participants 
were asked to imagine themselves performing the actions with those objects. This procedure 
aimed at increasing the effect of debriefing by reminding participants of the true objects with 
which they had performed an action. Yet, belief and memory ratings remained, on average, 
higher for fake than for new objects/actions, showing a persistent effect of our false memory 
manipulation. It should be noted that in addition to the doctored video, between Session 2 and 
3 (when the debriefing was given) participants were asked daily to imagine performing both 
the true and fake actions, and that this imaginative procedure was used to ensure that 
immediately before debriefing false memories for the fake actions were still present. This 
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procedure most likely strengthened the memory for the fake actions, and thus enhanced the 
persistence of memories even after the enhanced debriefing. Imagery added to the video has an 
additive effect on false memories (Nash et al., 2009b). It is possible, then, that the long-term 
false memories obtained in the current study depended also on the added effect of imagination.   
However, in an effort to enhance the effectiveness of the debriefing, participants 
imagined daily, and for a few days, only actions with true objects. The results indicate that 
imagining only true actions did not achieve the aim of completely discarding false memories. 
This result is not surprising, as it is well known in the false memory literature that it is much 
easier to add a false memory than to delete one (see for example Wright & Loftus, 1998). 
Similar to that study, in our study false memories are partially resistant to the attempt to discard 
them by presenting true information. The relative ineffectiveness of the enhanced debriefing is 
confirmed also by results on accuracy during recognition. Despite the drastic increase in 
accuracy for fake objects between Sessions 2 (before the debriefing) and 4 (after the 
debriefing), accuracy remained significantly lower than for new objects.  Overall, our results 
suggest that, at least in some cases, false memories are resistant to the attempt to discard them 
as false. 
Why then did the debriefing not entirely eliminate this type of false memories? Unlike 
most of the studies examining the persistence of false memories for lists of associated words 
using the DRM paradigm (see, e.g., McDermott, 1996; Seamon, Luo, Kopecky, Price, 
Rothschild, Fung, & Schwartz, 2002; Thapar & McDermott, 2001; Toglia, Neuschatz, & 
Goodwin, 1999), here false memories were for non-performed actions on non-presented 
objects.  In our case, the combination of actions with videos and imagination can create 
persistent false memories. First, doctored videos increased the plausibility of the suggested 
false memories. Participants actually observed the researcher performing actions with certain 
objects. Fake videos may have convinced participants not only that they had observed the 
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actions, but because in Session 1 all actions observed had also been performed, that they also 
had performed the fake actions. Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) claimed that false memories can 
be developed if individuals have acknowledged that the false event is highly likely to happen. 
During the debriefing, a considerable number of participants gave remarks such as, “I thought 
it was real”, “The editing is very good”, “I didn’t expect that it was actually two videos 
combined”, a strong indication that the fabricated video was really persuasive.  Second, 
fabricated evidence delivered in videos can be rich in sensory details because of the visual 
information provided. As already mentioned, doctored videos can trick the monitoring system 
into classifying as a true memory a false item which is rich in perceptual and conceptual details 
(Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Lindsay et al., 2004). The Source Monitoring 
Framework (SMF) is often used to explain how doctored evidence fosters false memories 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008). SMF suggests three cognitive mechanisms: familiarity, 
imagery, and credibility, to explain how doctored videos fabricate memories. Feelings of 
familiarity encourage individuals to misattribute suggested events as true memories.  In 
addition, people tend to evaluate information provided by others on the basis of credibility. 
Doctored evidence is often seen as a credible source of information, indicating that an event 
had happened (Wade et al., 2002). It might prompt people to adopt a lower memory criterion 
and acknowledge the content as a true memory. In other words, participants could have 
willingly considered false memories as being genuine even if less vivid because they had 
watched them in a video.  
Third, we claim that it might also be the nature of actions themselves, and in particular 
actions on objects, which might also create persistent false memories because of the 
sensory/motoric activation that is involved. Prior studies have shown that a mere observation 
of an action can cause an individual to attribute the action to him/herself, a phenomenon called 
observation inflation (Lindner, Echterhoff, Davidson, & Brand, 2010). According to this 
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phenomenon, observing an action causes an increase in familiarity (Thomas, Bulevich, & 
Loftus, 2003) and it also provides perceptual and contextual cues that can be misattributed as 
self- performed, especially when rigorous source monitoring is lacking (Johnson et al., 1993). 
Moreover, the motor representation of the observer matches the person executing the action, 
suggesting that a “covert” simulation of action occurs, which recruits neural structures similar 
to those involved in the actual action execution (Buccino et al., 2001; Wilson & Knoblich, 
2005). On the basis of this literature one could expect false beliefs for actions involving objects 
to be stronger than false beliefs for other types of material, and as such also more resistant to 
debriefing. The neurocognitive literature on action observation also highlights the importance 
of visually displaying the object. Studies on the mirror system indicate an activation on mirror 
neurons, especially in mirror areas of the pre-motor cortex, both when performing specific 
actions or during action observation (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 
1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Hari et al., 1998; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). In addition, some areas are selective for specific types of actions, 
like object/related actions. Observation of object-related actions results in a strong 
somatotopical activation on the posterior parietal lobe (for a complete review see, e.g., Caspers, 
Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010), and even the mere observation of an object, as well as merely 
reading the object’s name, can trigger the feeling of action (see, e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 2004). 
Last, as already mentioned, we also tried to strengthen the memory by asking our 
participants to “think” of performing an action with the objects for a couple of days before the 
debriefing. Repeated imagination is a well-established way of inducing false memories (Garry 
et al., 1996; Goff & Roediger, 1998; Lindner et al., 2010; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). Imagined 
events are highly likely to be attributed as true memories especially if they are easy to imagine 
(Finke, Johnson, & Shyi, 1988; Johnson, Raye, Wang, & Taylor, 1979). Imagining actions 
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might be even more influential, as it is a kinematic representation that typically involves self-
generation, a process that can enhance false memories (Sharman, Manning, & Garry, 2005). 
 Repeated imagination and presentation of doctored evidence are proven to be effective 
tools for false memory implantation. When combined, they can lead to false memories that are 
more persistent even after the debriefing. All these components (videos, imagination, actions) 
might have interacted, thus increasing the strength of these false memories and making them 
more resistant to the enhanced debriefing. Our study confirmed that fabricated videos and 
imagination create persistent false memories (Nash et al., 2009b), persistent enough to resist 
specific debriefing. While subsequent studies are necessary to disentangle the contribution of 
each component, one conclusion we can draw from this study is that it is necessary to take into 
account the nature of the processes involved in the creation of false memories, as these 
processes might determine their strength over time as well as their resistance to debriefing.  
We also examined the existence of NBMs on multiple recent actions using this 
procedure. Unlike previous studies (e.g., Clark et al., 2012), in the current study the debriefing 
did not decrease beliefs more than memories and thus a very small number of non-believed 
memories were obtained. There are several potential explanations for this difference in results. 
We administered the belief questionnaire first, while Clark et al. (2012) presented it after the 
memory questionnaire. Rating the belief first might have influenced the memory rating. It is 
also possible that in the language of the participants (Turkish), the distinction between belief 
and memory in daily context is less clear. Using belief in reference to memory is not a common 
practice, thus participants might not have fully understood the difference between belief and 
memory, which indeed received very similar ratings. One can also argue, however, that, unlike 
Clark et al. (2012), on which we based the current study, the actions used in our study involved 
objects. The presence of objects could reinforce the “motoric component” of the memory trace 
(see. e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998) which is known to be a crucial factor for its memorability (see, 
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e.g., Engelkamp, 2001; Ianì & Bucciarelli, 2017; 2018; Hilverman, Cook, & Duff, 2018) and 
thus make them more believable and experienced as true (which is reflected in the belief rating).  
Although debriefing did not result in non-believed memories, it had a significant effect 
on response times. In Session 4, fake objects were correctly rejected at a similar speed as new 
objects, while before the debriefing rejection times were significantly higher for fake than new 
objects. Although debriefing did not eliminate false memories, it seemingly had at least the 
effect of facilitating the decision when recognizing an object as fake and hence not originally 
presented. The effect of the debriefing on decision times is not in contrast with false memories 
persistence. We remind that overall many more false memories were correctly rejected after 
the debriefing, compared to before the debriefing. These correct rejections were made rather 
quickly for those false memories that people considered to be false. The effect on response 
times might be driven by the large number of correct rejections. However, one could speculate 
that decisions might have been rather fast also when accepting false memories as true. This 
possibility will be examined in a future study. 
Our results have relevant practical implications. First, assessing the cognitive effects of 
false evidence (both pre- and post- debriefing) is especially pertinent to the guidelines used 
during the interrogation of criminal suspects. Police investigators in some countries of the 
world are allowed to use false evidence in order to elicit a confession (for a discussion see, e.g., 
Gudjonsson, 2003). In light of our results, such error-prone or even false evidence can easily 
create memories that resist denial and clear debriefing. And, second, our results shed light on 
the possible consequences of using image/video manipulations in everyday life. We tend to 
believe what we see, but new technologies are increasingly blurring the line between fact and 
fiction (for instance, it has been suggested that many images posted on social networks are 
doctored; Ottke & Adam, 2015). Our results indicate that image/video manipulations can easily 
cause people to believe in something which is false. As pointed out by Wade et al. (2002), 
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“although doctoring personal photos may appear to be pure entertainment, the research [...] 
shows that exposure to altered photographs can lead to false memories” (p.597).   
Conclusion 
One of the necessary conclusions of this study is that the paradigm ideated by Nash and 
colleagues (2009b) is able to induce false memories that affect the decision of the participants 
in a recognition task. Second, one needs to be careful when presenting doctored videos, as the 
effect is not only long-lasting (one week), but for some memories it is rather persistent even 
after clear and specific disconfirmatory information is presented. Furthermore, our results shed 
light on cognitive mechanisms that take place when suggestions fail to create accepted false 
memories. Even in this case participants struggle to ignore the false information, thereby 
suggesting that a “covert false information” is still present. Future studies could investigate 
whether such cognitive processes can be considered the first step for a spontaneous 
development of future false memories. It is also worth revisiting other areas of research such 
as false confessions, misinformation effects and how people evaluate and re-evaluate the 











List of Pre-determined Objects 
 
1. Little cup  
2. Teaspoon  
3. Fork  
4. Mug  
5. Knife (breadknife) 
6. Toothbrush  
7. Comb  
8. Scissors  
9. Eraser 
10. Glove  
11. Wristwatch  
12. Glasses  
13. Whisk 
14. Small box  
15. Scarf 
16. Pencil  
17. Mobile Phone 
18. Keys  
19. Lighter  
20. Book 
21. Mouse 
22. Hammer  
23. Paintbrush  
24. Thimble  
25. Salt cellar  
26. Hat  
27. Wrench 
28. Screwdriver  
29. Spray  
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Table 1. Mean Belief, Memory, Accuracy (d’) Ratings and Response Times for Correct 
Responses pre and post-debriefing. Confidence intervals are also reported. 
      Pre debriefing 




    Significance 









Belief True     7.51 0.99 7.26 7.76 7.55 0.94 7.31 7.8 n.s. 
 Fake   4.49 2.63 3.81 5.16 1.99 1.66 1.56 2.41 ** 
  New    2.29 2.09 1.75 2.83 1.21 0.89 0.98 1.44 ** 
Memory  True    7.49 0.89 7.26 7.72 7.52 0.97 7.27 7.77 n.s. 
  Fake    4.35 2.74 3.65 5.05 1.86 1.49 1.48 2.25 ** 
 New   2.27 2.19 1.71 2.84 1.13 0.59 0.98 1.28 ** 
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**significant difference pre &post debriefing at p<.001 
*significant difference pre &post debriefing at p<.005 
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Figure 1. Video manipulation. (A) Real clip. (B) Fake action. (C) Doctored composite of (A) 
and (B). 
 
